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“No One Saw This Coming” 
Understanding Financial Crisis Through Accounting Models 
 
 
 
“She was asking me if these things are so large, how come everyone missed it?” 
Luis Garicano on the Queen’s visit to LSE, November 2008 
 
“The financial crisis will hopefully stimulate a revival of accounting scholarship aimed at understanding the 
relationship between accounting practice and the macro political and economic environment in which it 
operates.” 
Patricia Arnold, June 2009  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On March 14, 2008, Robert Rubin spoke at a session at the Brookings Institution in Washington, 
stating that "few, if any people anticipated the sort of meltdown that we are seeing in the credit 
markets at present”. Rubin is a former US Treasury Secretary, member of the top management team 
at Citigroup bank and one of the top Democratic Party policy advisers. On 9 December of that year 
Glenn Stevens, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia commented on the “international 
financial turmoil through which we have lived over the past almost year and a half, and the intensity 
of the events since mid September this year”. He went on to assert: “I do not know anyone who 
predicted this course of events. This should give us cause to reflect on how hard a job it is to make 
genuinely useful forecasts. What we have seen is truly a ‘tail’ outcome – the kind of outcome that 
the routine forecasting process never predicts. But it has occurred, it has implications, and so we 
must reflect on it” (RBA 2008). And in an April 9, 2009 lecture Nout Wellink - chairman of the 
Basel Committee that formulates banking stability rules and president of the Dutch branch of the 
European Central Bank - told his audience that “[n]o one foresaw the volume of the current 
avalanche”.  
These are three examples of the idea that ‘no one saw this coming’. This has been a common 
view from the very beginning of the credit crisis, shared from the upper echelons of the global 
financial and policy hierarchy and in academia to the general public. It continues to be publicised, 
as documented in more detail in the next section. And yet it would be premature to ask “Why did 
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nobody notice?", as Queen Elizabeth did as she inaugurated a new building at the London School of 
Economics in November 20081. Contrary to Governor Stevens’ assertion, it is not difficult to find 
predictions of a credit or debt crisis in the months and years leading up to it, and of the grave impact 
on the economy this would have - not only by pundits and bloggers, but by serious analysts from 
the world of academia, policy institutes, think tanks and finance. The starting point for the present 
study is that there is something to be learned from this observation – or, in the words of Governor 
Stevens, “it has occurred, it has implications, and so we must reflect on it”. To do precisely that is 
the aim of this paper. 
The credit crisis and ensuing recession may be viewed as a ‘natural experiment’ in the 
validity of economic models. Those models that failed to foresee something this momentous may 
need changing in one way or another. And the change is likely to come from those models (if they 
exist) which did lead their users to anticipate instability. The plan of this paper, therefore, is to 
document such anticipations, to identify the underlying models, to compare them to models in use 
by official forecasters and policy makers, and to draw out the implications. 
There is an immediate link to accounting, organizations and society. Previewing the results, 
it will be found that ‘accounting’ (or flow-of-funds) models of the economy are the shared mindset 
of those analysts who worried about a credit-cum-debt crisis followed by recession, before the 
policy and academic establishment did. They are ‘accounting’ models in the sense that they 
represent households’, firms’ and governments’ balance sheets and their interrelations. If society’s 
wealth and debt levels reflected in balance sheets are among the determinants of its growth 
sustainability and its financial stability, such models are likely to timely signal threats of instability. 
Models that do not – such as the general equilibrium models widely used in academic and Central 
Bank analysis – are prone to ‘Type II errors’ of false negatives – rejecting the possibility of crisis 
when in reality it is just months ahead. Moreover, if balance sheets matter to the economy’s macro 
performance, than the development of micro-level accounting rules and practices are integral to 
understanding broader economic development. This view shows any clear dividing line between 
‘economics’ and ‘accounting’ to be artificial, and on the contrary implies a role for an ‘accounting 
of economics’ research field. Thus this paper aims to encourage accountants to bring their 
professional expertise to what is traditionally seen as the domain of economists -  the assessment of 
financial stability and forecasting of the business cycle. 
                                                 
1
 Her question was directed at LSE Professor Luis Garicano, who responded: "At every stage, someone was 
relying on somebody else; and everyone thought they were doing the right thing." (Pierce, 2008) 
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With a few exceptions, this point seems to have been overlooked to date. The dominant 
response in the wake of the credit crisis in the accountants and auditors community has been to re-
examine accounting regulations such as ‘fair-value’ accounting (Boyer, 2007; Laux and Leuz 2009), 
mark-to-market accounting, lax auditing practices, and the like; or to ask how accounting models 
can reflect what has happened (Roberts and Jones, 2009). It is important to stress from the outset 
that the present paper aims to make an entirely different point. While it is topical in that it examines 
the recent credit crisis, its key argument is relevant beyond this episode. This study is 
fundamentally about how accounting as a discipline relates to business studies and economics – 
especially, macro economics. It is a response to the call by Arnold (2009) in this Journal to examine 
“our failure to understand the linkages between micro accounting and regulatory technologies, and 
the macroeconomic and political environment in which accounting operates”, and “to provide 
solutions”. It is likewise a response to the need identified by Hopwood (2009) to “explore the 
interface between accounting and finance”. This paper does not itself report on such exploration, 
but it aims to develop a framework that shows the need for such more detailed accounting research.  
The argument of this study is that recognizing the accounting forms in which economic (including 
financial) relations of necessity exist, is important – perhaps even indispensible – for understanding 
the economic and financial system’s sustainability, and whether there is a financial crisis looming. 
This thesis will be developed along the following lines. 
In the next two sections the results of the ‘fieldwork’ of this research are presented. Section 
2 briefly documents the sense of surprise at the credit crisis among academics and policymakers, 
giving rise to the view that ‘no one saw this coming’. Section 3 (and the Appendix) is a careful 
survey – applying a number of selection criteria - of those professional and academic analysts who 
did ‘see it coming’, and who issued public predictions of financial instability induced by falling real 
estate prices and leading to recession. The common elements in their analyses are identified, 
including an ‘accounting’ view of the economy. In section 4 the structure of accounting (or flow-of-
funds) models underlying some of the most explicit of these predictions is explored. Section 5 in 
turn describes and explores the mainstream alternative of ‘equilibrium’ models used by official 
national forecasters and international bodies such as the EU, OECD and IMF. Section 6 is a 
systematic comparison of the two types of models and their underlying views and section 7 reflects 
on their theoretical pedigrees. The final section summarizes the arguments and evidence of this 
paper, reflects on the implications, and points to opportunities for fruitful follow-up research. 
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2. ‘No one Saw This Coming’ 
 
The view that “[n]o one foresaw the volume of the current avalanche” appears justified by a lack of 
discussion, in the academic and policy press, of the possibility that financial globalization 
harboured significant risks, or that the US real estate market and its derivative products were in 
dangerous waters. Wellink (2009) quoted a 2006 IMF report on the global real estate boom 
asserting that there was “little evidence (..) to suggest that the expected or likely market corrections 
in the period ahead would lead to crises of systemic proportions”. On the contrary, those 
developments now seen as culprits of the crisis were until recently lauded by policy makers, 
academics, and the business community. The following examples illustrate. 
In an October 12, 2005 speech to the National Association for Business Economics, the then 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan spoke about the "development of financial products, 
such as asset-backed securities, collateral loan obligations, and credit default swaps, that facilitate 
the dispersion of risk… These increasingly complex financial instruments have contributed to the 
development of a far more flexible, efficient, and hence resilient financial system than the one that 
existed just a quarter-century ago." In line with these beliefs on increased ‘resilience’, Greenspan 
had in February 2005 asserted the US House Financial Services Committee that "I don't expect that 
we will run into anything resembling a collapsing [housing] bubble, though it is conceivable that we 
will get some reduction in overall prices as we've had in the past, but that is not a particular 
problem." 
Similarly, the Canadian academic Philip Das in a 2006 survey article of financial 
globalization pointed out its benefits as “[f]inancial risks, particularly credit risks, are no longer 
borne by banks. They are increasingly moved off balance sheets. Assets are converted into tradable 
securities, which in turn eliminates credit risks. Derivative transactions like interest rate swaps also 
serve the same purpose [of eliminating credit risks, DJB]”. Likewise, in August 2006, the IMF 
published “Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal” which, despite its title, confirmed IMF 
conventional wisdom that (p.1) “there is little systematic evidence to support widely cited claims 
that financial globalization by itself leads to deeper and more costly crises.” 
As to the business community, Landler (2007, 2008) reports that Klaus-Peter Müller, head 
of the New York branch of Commerzbank for more than a decade, in a 2008 New York Times article 
asked “Did I know in March of ’04 that there was a U.S. subprime market that was going to face 
serious problems in the next few years? No, I didn’t have the slightest idea. I was a happy man 
then.” Josef Ackermann, CEO of Deutsche Bank, likewise remembers a July 2007 luncheon 
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attended by chief executives of leading banks, political leaders, and senior Federal Reserve officials 
to discuss the looming risks to the financial system, on which the deepening woes in the subprime 
mortgage market did not figure high on the agenda: “We clearly underestimated the impact”, said 
Ackermann. 
These assessments by the experts carried over to a popular view, enunciated in the mass 
media, that the recessionary impacts of the credit crisis came out of the blue. USA Today in 
December 2006 reported on the fall in house prices that had just started that summer, “the good 
news is that far more economists are in the optimist camp than the pessimist camp. Although a 
handful are predicting the economy will slide into a housing-led recession next year, the majority 
anticipate the economy will continue to grow” (Hagenbauch 2006). Kaletsky (2008) wrote in the 
Financial Times of “those who failed to foresee the gravity of this crisis - a group that includes Mr 
King, Mr Brown, Alistair Darling, Alan Greenspan and almost every leading economist and 
financier in the world.” 
The surprise at this gravity was proportionate to the optimism beforehand.  Greenspan (2008) 
in his October 2008 testimony before the Committee of Government Oversight and Reform 
professed to “shocked disbelief” while watching his “whole intellectual edifice collapse in the 
summer of [2007]”. Das (2008) conceded that contrary to his earlier view of financial globalization 
‘eliminating’ credit risks, in fact “[p]artial blame for the fall 2008 meltdown of the global financial 
market does justly go to globalization.” The typical pattern was one of optimism shortly before and 
surprise shortly after the start of the crisis. 
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3. Common Elements of an Alternative View  
 
Despite appearances, this mainstream view was not the only serious ex ante assessment. An 
alternative, less sanguine interpretation of financial developments was publicized, and it was not 
confined to the inevitable fringe of bearish financial commentators. In this section serious analysis 
and public predictions of financial instability induced by falling real estate prices and leading to 
recession are documented. 
A major concern in collecting these data must be the ‘stopped clock syndrome’. A stopped 
clock is correct twice a day, and the mere existence of predictions is not informative on the 
theoretical validity of such predictions since, in financial market parlance, ‘every bear has his day’. 
Elementary statistical reasoning suggests that given a large number of commentators with varying 
views on some topic, it will be possible to find any prediction on that topic, at any point in time. 
With a large number of bloggers and pundits continuously making random guesses, erroneous 
predictions will be made and quickly assigned to oblivion, while correct guesses will be magnified 
and repeated after the fact. This in itself is no indication of their validity, but only of confirmation 
bias. 
In distinguishing the lucky shots from insightful predictions, the randomness of guesses is a 
feature to be exploited. Random guesses are supported by all sorts of reasoning (if at all), and will 
have little theory in common. Conversely, for a set of correct predictions to attain ex post credibility, 
it is additionally required that they are supported by a common theoretical framework. This study, 
then, looks to identify a set of predictions which are not only ex post correct but also rest on a 
common theoretical understanding. This will help identify the elements of a valid analytical 
approach to financial stability, and get into focus the contrast with conventional models. 
In collecting these cases in an extensive search of the relevant literature, four selection 
criteria were applied. Only analysts were included who provide some account on how they arrived 
at their conclusions. Second, the analysts included went beyond predicting a real estate crisis, also 
making the link to real-sector recessionary implications, including an analytical account of those 
links. Third, the actual prediction must have been made by the analyst and available in the public 
domain, rather than being asserted by others. Finally, the prediction had to have some timing 
attached to it. Applying these criteria led to the exclusion of a number of (often high profile) 
candidates - as detailed in the Appendix - so that the final selection is truly the result of critical 
scrutiny. 
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Descriptions of these analysts and their assessment are relegated to an Appendix. A 
summary overview is presented in Table 1. The twelve analysts described there - the number is 
entirely an outcome of the selection criteria - commented on the US, UK, Australian, Danish and 
global conditions in housing, finance and the broader economy. All except one are (or were) 
analysts and commentators of global fame. They are a mixed company of academics, government 
advisers, consultants, investors, stock market commentators and one graduate student, often 
combining these roles. Already between 2000 and 2006 they warned specifically about a housing-
led recession within years, going against the general mood and official assessment, and well before 
most observers turned critical from late 2007. Together they belie the notion that ’no one saw this 
coming’, or that those who did were either professional doomsayers or lucky guessers. 
But there is a more important, constructive contribution. An analysis of these cases allows 
for the identification of any common underlying analytical framework, which apparently helps 
detect threats of instability. Surveying these assessments and forecasts, there appears to be a set of 
interrelated elements central and common to the contrarians’ thinking. This comprises a concern 
with financial assets as distinct from real-sector assets, with the credit flows that finance both forms 
of wealth, with the debt growth accompanying growth in financial wealth, and with the accounting 
relation between the financial and real economy. In the remainder of this section these issues will be 
discussed in turn. 
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Table 1: Anticipations of the Housing Crisis and Recession 
Analyst Capacity Forecast 
 
Dean Baker, US co-director, Center for 
Economic and Policy 
Research 
 
“ …plunging housing investment will likely push the economy into 
recession.” (2006) 
Wynne Godley, US Distinguished Scholar, 
Levy Economics 
Institute of Bard 
College 
“The small slowdown in the rate at which US household debt levels are 
rising resulting form the house price decline, will immediately lead to 
a …sustained growth recession …  before 2010”. (2006). “Unemployment 
[will] start to rise significantly and does not come down again.” (2007) 
 
Fred Harrison, UK Economic 
commentator 
“The next property market tipping point is due at end of 2007 or early 
2008 …The only way prices can be brought back to affordable levels is a 
slump or recession” (2005). 
 
Michael Hudson, US professor, University 
of Missouri 
“Debt deflation will shrink the “real” economy, drive down real wages, and 
push our debt-ridden economy into Japan-style stagnation or worse.” 
(2006)  
 
Eric Janszen, US  investor and iTulip 
commentator 
“The US will enter a recession within years” (2006). “US stock markets are 
likely to begin in 2008 to experience a “Debt Deflation Bear Market” 
(2007) 
 
Stephen Keen, Australia associate professor, 
University of Western 
Sydney 
 
“Long before we manage to reverse the current rise in debt, the economy 
will be in a recession. On current data, we may already be in one.” (2006) 
 
Jakob Brøchner Madsen 
& 
Jens Kjaer Sørensen, 
Denmark 
professor  
& 
graduate student,  
Copenhagen 
University 
 
“We are seeing large bubbles and if they bust, there is no backup. The 
outlook is very bad” (2005)” The bursting of this housing bubble will have 
a severe impact on the world economy and may even result in a recession” 
(2006). 
 
Kurt Richebächer, US private consultant and 
investment newsletter 
writer 
“The new housing bubble – together with the bond and stock bubbles – will 
invariably implode in the foreseeable future, plunging the U.S. economy 
into a protracted, deep recession” (2001). “A recession and bear market in 
asset prices are inevitable for the U.S. economy… All remaining questions 
pertain solely to speed, depth and duration of the economy’s downturn.”  
(2006) 
 
Nouriel Roubini, US  professor,  New York 
University 
 
“Real home prices are likely to fall at least 30% over the next 3 
years“(2005). “By itself this house price slump is enough to trigger a US 
recession.” (2006) 
 
Peter Schiff , US stock broker, 
investment adviser 
and commentator 
“[t]he United States economy is like the Titanic ...I see a real financial 
crisis coming for the United States.” (2006). “There will be an economic 
collapse” (2007). 
 
Robert Shiller , US professor, Yale 
University 
“There is significant risk of a very bad period, with rising default and 
foreclosures, serious trouble in financial markets, and a possible recession 
sooner than most of us expected.” (2006) 
 
   
Note: for sources and more detail, please refer to the Appendix. 
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A broadly shared element of analysis is the distinction between financial wealth and real assets. 
Several of the commentators (Schiff and Richebächer) adhere to the ‘Austrian School’ in economics, 
which means that they emphasize savings, production (not consumption) and real capital formation 
as the basis of sustainable economic growth. Richebächer (2006a:4) warns against ““wealth 
creation” though soaring asset prices” and sharply distinguishes this from “saving and 
investment…” (where investment is in real-sector, not financial assets). Likewise Shiller (2003) 
warns that our infatuation with the stock market (financial wealth) is fuelling volatility and 
distracting us from more the durable economic prospect of building up real assets. Hudson (2006a) 
comments on the unsustainable “growth of net worth through capital gains”. 
A concern with debt as the counterpart of financial wealth follows naturally. “The great 
trouble for the future is that the credit bubble has its other side in exponential debt growth” writes 
Richebächer (2006b:1). Madsen from 2003 worried that Danes were living on borrowed time 
because of the mortgage debt which “had never been greater in our economic history”. Godley in 
2006 published a paper titled Debt and Lending: A Cri de Coeur where he demonstrated the US 
economy’s dependence on debt growth. He argued it would plunge the US into a “sustained growth 
recession … somewhere before 2010” (Godley and Zezza, 2006:3). Schiff points to the low savings 
rate of the United States as its worst malady, citing the transformation from being the world’s 
largest creditor nation in the 1970s to the largest debtor nation by the year 2000. Hudson (2006a) 
emphasized the same ambiguous potential of house price ‘wealth’ already in the title of his Saving, 
Asset-Price Inflation, and Debt-Induced Deflation, where he identified the ‘large debt overhead - 
and the savings that form the balance-sheet counterpart to it’ as the ‘anomaly of today’s [US] 
economy’. He warned that ‘[r]ising debt-service payments will further divert income from new 
consumer spending. Taken together, these factors will further shrink the “real” economy, drive 
down those already declining real wages, and push our debt-ridden economy into Japan-style 
stagnation or worse.” (Hudson 2006b). Janszen (2009) wrote that “US households and businesses, 
and the government itself, had since 1980 built up too much debt. The rate of increase in debt was 
unsustainable… Huge imbalances in the US and global economy developed for over 30 years. Now 
they are rebalancing, as many non-mainstream economists have warned was certain to happen 
sooner or later.” Keen (2006) wrote that the debt-to-GDP ratio in Australia (then 147 per cent) “will 
exceed 160 per cent of GDP by the end of 2007. We simply can't keep borrowing at that rate. We 
have to not merely stop the rise in debt, but reverse it. Unfortunately, long before we manage to do 
so, the economy will be in a recession.” 
These quotes already reflect a further concern, that growth in financial wealth and the 
attendant growth in debt can become a determinant (instead of an outcome) of economic growth, 
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undermining its sustainability and leading to a downturn. There is a recurrent emphasis (e.g. Baker 
2007), that home equity-fuelled consumption has in recent years sustained stable growth (especially 
in the US and UK) more than anything else, and that this was dangerous. Harrison (2007) 
juxtaposed his view to those who “assume that the health of the property market depends upon the 
condition of the rest of the economy. In fact, … property is the key factor that shapes the business 
cycle, not the other way around.” Baker (2002) wrote that “[w]hile the short-term effects of a 
housing bubble appear very beneficial—just as was the case with the stock bubble and the dollar 
bubble—the long-term effects from its eventual deflation can be extremely harmful”. Godley and 
Wray (2000) argued that stable growth in the US was unsustainable, as it was driven by households’ 
debt growth, in turn fuelled by capital gains in the real estate sector. Their view was that as soon as 
debt growth slowed down – as it inevitably would within years - growth would falter and recession 
set in. 
This recessionary impact of the bursting of asset bubbles is also a shared view. The bursting 
of the international housing bubble was seen to have “a severe impact on the world economy and 
may even result in a recession” (Sørensen, 2006:97). Richebächer (2006a:4) in July 2006 
commented that “[t]he one thing that still separates the U.S. economy from economic and financial 
disaster is rising house prices that apparently justify ever more credit and debt”… and in August 
2006 that “a recession and bear market in asset prices are inevitable for the U.S. economy.” Aagain, 
“[t]here is no question that the U.S. housing bubble is finished. All remaining questions pertain 
solely to speed, depth and duration of the economy’s downturn” (Richebächer, 2006c:9). Roubini 
on August 23, 2006 - only weeks after US house prices had started falling  - already wrote that 
“[b]y itself this [house price] slump is enough to trigger a US recession.” 
 Finally, emphasis on the role of credit cycles in the business cycle leads to a long-term view 
on credit cycles. Sørensen criticizes most housing market analyses for not looking beyond the 
1980s-2000s period. These were the years of a credit boom, and only by looking at longer periods 
can the dynamics and dangers of the housing market be detected, he demonstrates. Also others 
place the long credit boom that started in the mid 1980s as central to understanding economic 
performance, and assert that acceleration of growth in lending and debt has endangered stability 
since. The assessment of the 2007-8 collapse is so embedded in a longer-term view. “This recovery 
has been fueled by a housing bubble, just as the late 90s cycle was fueled by a stock bubble,” 
commented Baker. Accordingly, US economic growth since the 2000 dotcom crash, is viewed by 
several as ‘phony’ growth in that it was (consciously or unwittingly) engineered by the monetary 
authorities via generous credit policies, rather than driven by real-sector performance. 
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4. Accounting Models of the Economy 
 
The above concerns with wealth, debt, and credit flows can be summarized in saying that the above 
authors take an ‘accounting’ or ‘flow-of-funds’ view of the economy. This is most explicit with 
Keen (2006), Hudson (2006a, 2006b), and especially Godley (1999; also, Godley and Lavoie 2007), 
who each actually present explicit accounting models of the economy. Key features of such models 
include (a) the circular flow of goods and money, (b) a separate representation of stocks 
(inventories, wealth and debt) and flows (goods, services and funds), (c) explicit modelling of the 
financial sector as distinct from the real economy, so allowing for independent growth and 
contraction effects from finance on the economy, (d) non-optimising behaviour by economic agents 
in an environment of uncertainty, and (e) accounting identities (not the equilibrium concept) as 
determinants of model outcomes in response to shocks in the environment or in policy. These 
features are graphically captured in Figure 1 taken from Hudson (2006b), which depicts an 
economy (simplified, without foreign sector) viewed through a flow-of-funds prism. Similar 
‘circuitist’ representations may be found in theoretical work by Rochon (1999) and Graziani (2003). 
This section discusses how those elements of ‘accounting’ or ‘flow-of-funds’ models are 
central in understanding the determinants of (and boundaries to) the economy’s growth and its 
likelihood of entering into a debt-driven recession. The significance of studying these models is also 
in identifying the differences with conventional policy models, discussed in the next section. 
Juxtaposing the two approaches of ‘accounting’ versus ‘equilibrium’ models may help understand 
why ‘no one saw this coming’ among users of equilibrium models, while some others using 
accounting models did.  Further, conceptualizing both types of theories is one way to identify entry 
points for “accounting’s engagement with political economy” which “can be defined more broadly 
to include any non-neoclassical economic framework for understanding the economy and 
accounting’s relationship to it.” (Arnold 2009). Flow-of-fund models, and their underpinnings taken 
from psychology and political economy, are among these non-neoclassical economic frameworks. 
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Figure 1: Schematic Overview of Flow-of-fund Models 
 
Source: Hudson (2006b) 
 
The finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector includes all sorts of wealth-managing nonbank 
firms (pension funds, insurers, money managers, merchant banks, real estate agents etc.), as well as 
deposit-taking banks, which generate credit flows. It is conceptually separate from the real sector 
which comprises government, firms and households. Liquidity from the FIRE sector flows to firms, 
households and the government as they borrow. It facilitates fixed-capital investment, production 
and consumption, the value of which - by accounting necessity - is jointly equal to real-sector 
income in the form of profit, wages and taxes plus financial investment and obligations (principally, 
interest payments). Funds so originate in the banking part of the FIRE sector and either circulate in 
the real economy, or they return to the FIRE sector as financial investments or in payment of debt 
service and financial fees. Total credit flows (in nominal currency units) are normally increasing 
year on year, reflecting positive profit and interest rates. 
Thus, there is a trade-off between the financing of production (out of retained earnings and 
fresh lending) on the one hand, and credit flows returning into the financial sector on the other. This 
trade-off is absent from the mainstream models and debate, but is crucial to understanding crisis, 
according to Friedman (2009): “an important question—which no one seems interested in 
addressing—is what fraction of the economy's total returns … is absorbed up front by the financial 
industry.”  Below is a detailed examination of how this neglected question matters. 
Another presentation of flow-of-fund-models, which is especially suited to bring out their 
accounting nature, is in matrix form. Figure 2 presents the matrix of flows of transactions of the 
Godley (1999) model. Figure 3 presents the stocks in balance sheets, by sector. 
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Figure 2: The Flow of Funds in Matrix Representation 
 
Source: Godley (1999:395) 
 
 
Figure 3: Macro Balance Sheets in Matrix Representation 
 
Source: Godley (1999:395) 
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Like the Figure 1 representation of a flow-of-funds model taken from Hudson (2006a), the Godley 
(1999) model consists of four sectors, explicitly separating out the financial sector, with their 
properties and interrelations represented in over 60 equations. It reflects Keynesian uncertainty (on 
which more in section 6) by including ‘expected’ values of, for instance, inventories. Other 
important elements in common with Figure 1 are the centrality of bank credit flows, since “evolving 
finance in the form of bank loans is required if production is to be financed in advance of sales 
being made and if profit is to be extracted from firms and paid over to households” (Godley, 
1999:405). Yet another element is explicitly including payment flows such as interest payments, 
“not quite the same as in the national accounts, where it is standard practice… to ignore interest 
payments, although they are an inevitable cost given that production takes time” (Godley, 
1999:405). 
Godley (1999:394) explains that: “[e]ach row and column of the flow matrix sums to zero 
on the principle that each flow comes from somewhere and goes somewhere. The financial balance 
of each sector – the gap between its income and its expenditure reading vertically [in Figure 2] – is 
always equal to the total of its transactions in financial assets.” The model reflects changes in the 
value of financial stocks, in inventories, and in household wealth. Because of the accounting 
equalities, this is equal to the sum of government debt and inventories (reading horizontally at the 
foot of Figure 3). The “watertight accounting of the model implies that there will always be one 
equation which is logically implied by the others” (Godley 1999:395). 
How did the structure of flow-of-fund models allow their users to distinguish between 
financially sustainable and unsustainable growth, and so to anticipate a credit-cum-debt crises? 
Consider the reasoning, along the following lines. A benchmark scenario of financially sustainable 
growth is when the economy expands with constant fractions of it credit flows going to the financial 
and real sectors. Debt burdens do not grow as proportion of the real economy and therefore remain 
serviceable, and the FIRE sector cannot have a bad loan problem. Conversely, debt growth is the 
central factor in undermining the financial sustainability of economic growth. Of all possible 
configurations of behaviour in the Godley model, only a default on debt can “unbalance the banks’ 
consolidated balance sheet” Godley (1999: 397).  
Conditions for such default may develop as, different from the benchmark scenario, 
financial expansion or financial innovation occurs. This may be driven by the real economy 
requiring more of its wealth to be managed in financial instruments and assets, or because of the 
need for new financial instruments responding to changed needs to save, to invest and to smooth 
consumption. This will be reflected in a one-off (or in any case temporary) shifting of credit flow 
fractions, which a larger fraction being used for financial transactions vis a vis real-sector 
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transactions in goods and services. Financial innovation so serves the real economy’s need, in that it 
boosts real-sector productivity and its ability to service its increased debts. But it also opens up the 
possibility of a sustained drain of liquidity from the real to the FIRE sector, so inflating asset prices 
– a credit bubble, or harmful ‘financialization’ of the economy (Epstein 2005). Arnold (2009), 
quoting Giovanni Arrighi’s (2007:230) definition of financialization as the ‘capacity of finance 
capital to take over and dominate, for a while at least, all the activities of the business world’ 
identifies the financialization process since the late 1970s as a “transformation within the macro 
political economy [which] poses several questions for accounting research as we attempt to 
understand accounting’s relationship to the unfolding crisis”. Consider this ‘financialisation’ 
scenario, pertinent to recent experience, through a flow-of-funds lens. 
By accounting identity, any credit flows to firms and households (through banks’ credit 
creation as they lend) exceeding the growth of investment, production and consumption in the real 
economy will be held as wealth, and so invested in FIRE sector assets. This extra liquidity inflates 
the money value of financial assets and instruments (housing, stocks, bonds, currency, derivative 
instruments etc.), so increasing returns on financial investments. Through their rising net worth, 
firms and households can - if lending regulations allow -  borrow more against their collateral; and 
if they believe this to be sustainable, they will. This means that banks create yet additional credit 
which is again invested in the FIRE sector, further pushing up asset prices. Each flow of credit has 
its balance sheet counterpart in increased debt levels for firms and households. The new situation is 
characterized by (a) higher returns on financial assets relative to real-economy investment, and (b) a 
larger part of the (say, annual) credit flow going towards debt servicing and financial fees, and a 
smaller part to investment in the real sector (see Stockhammer, 2004 for evidence on this). In early 
stages of a financial asset boom, the benefits from (1) will more than balance the costs of (2), 
especially if future debt servicing costs are discounted or neglected. This encourages a next cycle of 
credit flows, debt growth and asset price rises. With psychological mechanisms such as herding 
behaviour leading to housing or stock market euphoria - and in the absence of regulation to stop it - 
there can be a self-sustained dynamic of credit flows shifting away from the real economy and into 
financial asset market, with ever growing financial asset returns and individual net worth figures, 
and a growing debt service burden on the real economy. Along the course of this financial boom, 
Friedman’s (2009) all-important ‘fraction of the economy's total returns absorbed up front by the 
financial industry rises and the function of the financial system in the economy’ changes from 
supportive to extractive. Consumption – and the production that depends on it -  may become 
financed more by fresh credit and debt flows from the FIRE sector based on capital gains than by 
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real-sector wages and profit. Thus net saving by firms and households may fall and even turn 
negative. 
An accounting (or balance sheet) view of the economy makes clear that this dynamic – a 
bubble – is unsustainable in the sense that it is constrained by the real economy’s ability to service 
debt. Yet without policy intervention, it can last for many years or even decades, if starting from 
low levels of indebtedness. A burst occurs as investors realize this constraint is approaching or has 
been reached. The severity of the impact of a burst will be the larger as real-economy consumption 
(and thereby production) have grown more dependent on capital gains rather than on wages and 
profit. 
This ‘financialisation’ scenario is a self-sustained dynamic separate from real-sector 
fundamentals (in other words, a bubble) increasing debt burdens but not bolstering the real-
economy’s potential to create valued added from which to repay its growing debt. It is typically 
driven by the psychological and political economy factors discussed in section 3. In terms of 
financial incentives, its impetus is that it brings increased asset price gains for a time, but this is 
unsustainable in the long term as a source of debt servicing. Borio (2004:5) writes that “contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the growth of markets for tradable instruments … need not have reduced the 
likelihood of funding (liquidity) crises”. On the contrary, applying an accountig lens demonstrates 
that because of the debt growing in parallel with tradable instruments, inevitably a bad loan problem 
(or debt crisis) develops, credit flows dry up –either in a ‘soft landing’ or in a ‘credit crisis’ -  and a 
repositioning of financial portfolios and real-sector activity follows. The difference with sustainable 
financial innovation is difficult to draw while a financial bubble lasts, and mostly absent in the 
mainstream and popular discourses. As Friedman (2009) notes, “what is sorely missing in the 
discussion is attention to what function the financial system is supposed to perform in the economy 
and how well it has been doing it”. That may be true for mainstream economists, but - as detailed in 
the Appendix - an accounting view of the economy did allow other analysts well before the bust to 
perceive this difference. Monitoring the accounting relations between the real economy and the 
financial sector flow revealed the growing imbalance in the flow of funds between the real and 
financial sectors, as well as the extent to which the economy had grown dependent on asset price 
gains. It so led to a projection of the limits to the economy’s debt servicing capacity and the 
unsustainability of credit and debt growth, resulting in the Table 1 forecasts. 
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5. Structure and Institutionalization of Equilibrium Models 
 
The alternative to the accounting models just reviewed will be referred to as ‘equilibrium’ models, 
after their most important trait. Wealth, debt, and the flow of funds are largely absent from these 
models. These are ‘mainstream‘ models in the sense that all official macroeconomic forecasts, 
policy analyses and scenario building, in all countries, are based on equilibrium models (or on rules 
of thumb2). They are also ‘mainstream’ in the sense of being based on neoclassical economics, the 
mode of economic analysis that is dominant in the academic discipline of economics. This section 
presents case studies of a national and an international forecasting model of the equilibrium variety. 
The discussion will relate to model structures and the forecasts they generated, as well as to their 
institutional embeddedness and standing in the policy community. 
The national model discussed here is the ‘Washington University Macro Model’ (WUMM) 
used in US policy making, developed and marketed by the firm “Macroeconomic Advisers”3. The 
“WUMM” is a quarterly econometric system of roughly 600 variables, 410 equations, and 165 
exogenous variables. Figure 4 presents a schematic overview. The boxes indicate the variables 
included in the model. In the present context, the important observation is that all are real-sector 
variables except the money supply and interest rates, the values of which are in turn fully 
determined by real-sector variables. In contrast to accounting models, the financial sector is thus 
absent (not explicitly modelled) in the model. 
                                                 
2
 Some authorative forecast, such as those published by the Conference Board, are constructed by projecting current 
trends of ‘Leading Economic Indicators’, using relatively simply ‘rules of thumb‘ for the extrapolation. The success of 
these forecasts relative to the alternatives demonstrates how difficult it is to predict based on theory-based models. 
Naturally, rules of thumb models do well in times of stability but not around points of radical change. 
3
 Unless otherwise indicated, all information on the WUMM is taken from the Macroeconomic Advisers site at 
http://www.macroadvisers.com. 
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Figure 4  Schematic Overview of the Washington University Macro Model 
 
Source: WUMM (2009) 
 
The detailed explanation in the WUMM model book confirms that relations between variables in 
the model - represented by the arrows in Figure 4 - reflect the standard assumptions of mainstream 
economics including a life-cycle model of consumption, a transactions model of money demand, a 
vertical long-run Phillips curve, and long-run neoclassical models of fixed investment, labour 
demand, pricing and the distribution of income. If these assumptions are correct, then the model 
provides detailed predictions on the real economy. But by design, it cannot reflect a bubble driven 
by credit flows to the FIRE sector, which bursts due to excessive levels of debt: credit flows, the 
FIRE sector and debt are not among the variables in the model, nor are they fully reflected in the 
variables which are included. 
Perhaps because of this omission, Macroeconomic Advisers chairman Joel Prakken could 
tell Reuters as late as September 2007 that the probability of recession was less than 50%, a 
“slightly higher risk than it was a month ago but not a dominant risk.” This was well after Godley 
and associates in April 2007 had predicted output growth “slowing down almost to zero sometime 
between now and 2008” and in November 2007 forecast “a significant drop in borrowing and 
private expenditure in the coming quarters, with severe consequences for growth and 
unemployment”. 
A prominent example of equilibrium models for international use is the model operated by 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), described in Rae and 
Turner (2001). This is the OECD’s “small global forecasting” model linked to its larger forecasting 
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model called INTERLINK, used to produce globally-consistent short-term forecasts of the major 
aggregates for the United States, the Euro area, and Japan. Its key variables include output, inflation, 
the trade balance, and import prices. These are driven jointly by neoclassical theory and monetary 
and fiscal policy, exchange rates, and world demand. 
Just as in the WUMM, monetary and financial variables are included, but their values do not 
result from explicitly modeled flows of funds and are derived exclusively from real-sector 
developments. For instance, inflation depends on the output gap – that is, the gap between actual 
output and potential output – and various components of imported inflation. The model as a whole 
has the property that output gaps will eventually close to restore equilibrium. Other financial 
variables - including nominal exchange rates and short-term and long-term interest rates - are 
determined by forward-looking monetary policy rules in which short-term interest rates depend also 
on the output gap and on the expected future core inflation rate. Bond rates in turn then depend on 
expected future short-term rates. There are no credit flows, asset prices or increasing net worth 
driving a borrowing boom, nor interest payment indicating growing debt burdens, and no balance 
sheet stock and flow variables that would reflect all this. 
It is interesting that the authors recognize this omission, and discuss that such elements can 
be added on an ad hoc basis. Rae and Turner (2001:5) write that this introducing of “alternative 
assumptions … allows a little more economic richness to be temporarily added to the model when it 
is used for policy analyses, especially for those situations in which financial markets and 
expectations play important roles in the transmission of shocks within and between regions”. 
Likewise, “[s]everal country-specific variables have been added to the domestic demand equations 
in order to capture recent experience. For the United States, a measure of share-market wealth 
relative to disposable income has been an important recent determinant of domestic demand. The 
Japanese equation includes the real price of land because the 1990s cannot be explained by 
monetary and fiscal variables alone. The long stagnation is partly driven by balance sheet problems 
in the financial sector, which in turn is partly the result of the collapse of asset prices since the late 
1980s.” (Rae and Turner, 2001:12). In addition to its ad hoc adjustment to the reality of balance 
sheet effects, the OECD is currently planning the introduction of a new model, triggered by 
‘changing conditions’. The new model includes “domestic and global stock-flow consistency with 
respect to wealth linkages and wealth effects” (Richardson 2006), very similar in name at least to 
Godley’s ‘stock-flow consistent model’ (Godley and Lavoie 2007). 
Still, just three months before the financial crisis broke in August 2007, the OECD released 
its 2007 World Economic Outlook, in which it commented (OECD 2007:7) that 
 
 21 
“[i]n its Economic Outlook last autumn, the OECD took the view that the US slowdown was not 
heralding a period of worldwide economic weakness, unlike, for instance, in 2001. Rather, a 
“smooth” rebalancing was to be expected, with Europe taking over the baton from the United States 
in driving OECD growth. Recent developments have broadly confirmed this prognosis. Indeed, the 
current economic situation is in many ways better than what we have experienced in years. Against 
that background, we have stuck to the rebalancing scenario. Our central forecast remains indeed 
quite benign: a soft landing in the United States, a strong and sustained recovery in Europe, a solid 
trajectory in Japan and buoyant activity in China and India. In line with recent trends, sustained 
growth in OECD economies would be underpinned by strong job creation and falling 
unemployment.” 
Other important mainstream forecasts by international bodies, such as those by the European 
Commission and the IMF, will not be discussed separately. They derive from models structurally 
similar to that of the OECD, and were subject to the same degree of misprediction around the crisis. 
For what they have in common is the rapid and unprecedented revision of economic growth 
forecasts when the credit crisis began to turn into a recession. In the Economic Outlook 2008 
published in December 2007, the OECD forecast was that weakness in the US housing sector would 
drag down growth in “the near term” but it “is unlikely to trigger a recession”. GDP growth was 
forecast to 2.0% in 2008. But at the time of this prediction Europe, the US and Japan were already 
in recession, and continued to be so throughout 2008. Instead of the models predicting reality, they 
were constantly catching up with reality. 
As an example, Figure 3 presents the forecasts for the author’s home of The Netherlands as 
made by the IMF, the European Commision (EC), the OECD (OESO in the Dutch abbreviation), 
the CPB (Centraal Planbureau, the official Dutch agency tasked with constructing macroeconomic 
forecasts) and also by the Dutch branch of the European Central Bank, DNB (De Nederlandsche 
Bank). All these official institutions use equilibrium models in constructing their forecasts. The 
graph shows that within the space of six months, consensus forecasts for 2009 GDP growth were 
revised from +1.2 % to – 3.5 %: a change which has never happened before. At the time of this 
writing in May 2009, the official Dutch forecast by the CPB had again been revised to – 4.8 %.   
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Figure 5 Changing official forecasts for the Dutch economy: Expected GDP growth rate in 
2009, September 2008 – March 2009  
 
Source: CPB (2009) 
 
In conclusion of this section, one question that may be raised is why there is this dichotomy of 
equilibrium models dominating official forecasting and policy, and flow-of-funds models in use 
only in non-official analyses. Arnold (2009) asks accountants “[w]hy did neoclassical economic 
thought become unquestioned doctrine in so much of our economic discourse?”. And why indeed, 
do accountants have so little to add in the fields of macro financial stability assessment and growth 
forecasting, despite the demonstrated potential? Tentatively, two elements of an answer may be 
suggested: theory and institutionalization. 
 As noted, equilibrium models in use in policy making reflect neoclassical economics, the 
approach to economic analysis that is dominant in academic economics departments. This includes 
the behavioural assumptions of individual optimizing behaviour and a passive role (adapting to the 
‘fundamentals’) for the financial sector and for the flow of funds. Flow-of-fund or accounting 
models reflect assumptions about the role of the financial sector and about individuals’ behaviour 
which are heterodox relative to this academic orthodoxy. Given the strong intertwinement of 
economics teaching, research and policy making, it is only natural that heterodox models have not 
gained a foothold in official forecasting and policymaking. Institutionalization of forecasting 
models in policy follows the institutionalization of equilibrium theory in academia. In order to 
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probe this hypothesis, below the institutionalization of the leading US forecasting model WUMM 
within US academia and policy making is studied4. 
On its link to orthodox economic theory, the WUMM model book explains that the 
“properties of all key equations are explicitly derived from neoclassical theory, imparting to the 
model both monetarist and supply-side characteristics in the long run. This emphasis on theory 
endows the model with an internally consistent structure that renders WUMM well suited not only 
for short-run forecasting but also for long-term policy analysis.” 
On the institutionalization, WUMM owner Macroeconomic Advisers, while an independent 
commercial firm, is closely intertwined with official policy and forecasts and with US academia. It 
started in 1982 as Laurence H. Meyer & Associates. The model used by Macroeconomic Advisers 
was developed by Meyer and collaborators at Washington University and licensed to clients from 
1983. The model won wide acclaim in government circles and there is a revolving door between the 
US Federal Reserve and its three Directors, each of whom have held or now hold top positions in 
US monetary policy advice5.  
The Macroeconomic Advisers approach also reflects the official US viewpoint on financial 
stability as its founder Laurence Meyer participated in negotiations toward a new international 
capital accord and represented the Federal Reserve Board in the international Financial Stability 
Forum. Significantly, Meyer was also chairman of the US Committee on Supervisory and 
Regulatory Affairs and oversaw the Board’s regulatory implementation of Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act. This act in 1999 replaced the more cautious 1933 Glass Steagall Act and allowed banks to 
trade in mortgages and derivative products. Meyer so maintains close ties with US monetary policy 
making6. He is also a highly respected academic macro economist. He holds a professorship in 
economics at the University of Washington and published hundreds of articles in leading economics 
journals. 
A tentative conclusion from this case study might be that equilibrium models and official 
forecasters are bound by ties of theoretical kinship and institutional embeddedness – ties that 
                                                 
4
 Unless otherwise indicated, all information on the WUMM is taken from the Macroeconomic Advisers site at 
http://www.macroadvisers.com. 
5
 Chairman Joel Prakken served with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York prior to co-founding Laurence H. 
Meyer & Associates. Co-founder and President Chris Vervares was a member of the staff of the President’s Council of 
Economic Advisers in 1981-1982. Laurence Meyer served on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors from June 1996 
(upon which the name of the firm was changed from Laurence H. Meyer & Associates to Macroeconomic Advisers) to 
January 2002. In addition Brian Sack came to Macroeconomic Advisers in 2004 from a Federal Reserve Board position, 
and in 2009 left to serve at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
6
 Macroeconomic Advisers advertises its founder by noting on its site that Meyer was lauded by the then Chairman Alan 
Greenspan who said that, “Larry Meyer has made an important contribution to the Board’s monetary policy. His 
thoughtful insights … have materially enhanced the deliberations of the Board and the Federal Open Market Committee. 
His influence will carry on beyond his tenure as a Board member.” 
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include academia and policy makers at the highest levels. The sociology of science and policy 
making suggest that it would be difficult to insert in this constellation an approach that is   
scientifically heterodox and politically critical of the monetary policy establishment – two 
distinguishing features of all analysts listed in Table 1. On the other hand, as noted the OECD 
appears to be moving in the direction of including balance sheet elements in its model. 
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6. Comparing Accounting and Equilibrium Models 
 
Having reviewed both types of models, in this section their key differences are identified and 
discussed. A foundational issue, from which more specific differences follow, is the organizing 
principle of market equilibrium induced by firms and households acting as rationally optimizing 
economic agents. In contrast to this feature of models used for official forecasts, flow-of-und 
models have an emphasis on accounting identities, on the role of uncertainty, of economic 
psychology and on political economy as the key behavioural assumptions. Absence of the notion of 
equilibrium does not mean that these models are indeterminate. They do have steady states (Godley 
1999) and the logical implications of accounting models are determinate - in some respects more so 
than those of equilibrium models, as will be discussed below. 
Most of the analysts discussed in the Appendix reject rational equilibrium on the basis of 
arguments related to economic psychology and to the Keynesian notion of ‘radical uncertainty’ (as 
opposed to calculable risks). Keen, in a 1995 article titled ‘Finance and Economic Breakdown’ 
explained that 
 
“Keynes argued that uncertainty cannot be reduced to ‘the same calculable states as that 
of certainty itself’ whereas the kind of uncertainty that matters in investment is that 
about which “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability 
whatever. We simply do not know” (Keynes, 1937:213-24). Keynes argued that in the 
midst of this incalculable uncertainty, investors form fragile expectations about the 
future, which are crystallized in the prices they place upon capital sets, and that these 
prices are therefore subject to sudden and violent change.” 
 
This view of human assessment and investment behaviour allows for a crisis of confidence in a way 
that equilibrium models – where investment is always guided by the marginal costs and benefits of 
underlying real capital assets – cannot. This possibility, in turn, allowed the above analysts to 
contemplate the plausibility that the general mood is not rational but mistaken, and that crisis looms 
amidst seemingly tranquil conditions. 
Specifically, housing market participants in a credit boom are viewed as led to speculation 
by psychological mechanisms well-known in a bull market. Harrison (2005) observes that economic 
expansion encourages a speculation mentality, with banks lending more against escalating asset 
values and reinforcing the upward spiral. Shiller (2000, 2008) writes of the ‘contagion effect’ as the 
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principal mechanism feeding bubbles. Beliefs about wealth creation through asset prices spread via 
a number of mechanisms such as ‘new era’ stories that justify the capital gains as being part of a 
‘new economy’, where the novel aspect resides in, for instance, technology (in the 1990s) or 
globalization (in the 2000s). Shiller (e.g., 2000) has articulated motivational models of human 
behaviour such as ‘irrational exuberance’, which allow for states of the economy such as euphoric 
booms, busts, and recession – all of which are difficult to grasp in the conventional models. Other 
authors refer to related ideas as developed by Minsky (e.g., 1978). Sørensen (2006) similarly 
explains the housing bubble by information cascades and herding behaviour, where investors 
observing gainful speculation are more likely to engage in speculation, regardless of the underlying 
fundamentals. 
As to political economy, the boom was seen to be fuelled by monetary policies of generous 
credit flows and low interest rates and the un-taxing of real estate gains via depreciation and interest 
payments tax rules7. These policies are observed to have helped stave off (intendedly or otherwise) 
recession after the 1999 dotcom collapse, even though in fostering a wealth-cum-debt bubble they 
stored up the present trouble. Janszen (2001) “expected that after the technology bubble crash the 
Federal Reserve and government was certain via tax cuts, rate cuts, and stealth dollar devaluation to 
induce a reflation boom like the 1934 - 1937 reflation created after the 1929 stock market bubble 
bust.” Richebächer (2006a) writes of “ultra-cheap and loose money and credit“, and that “[t]he U.S. 
liquidity deluge of the last few years has had one single source: borrowing against rising assets 
backed by the Fed’s monetary looseness” (Richebächer 2006b). 
This underlying difference with the neoclassical equilibrium assumption finds expression in 
the way models are structured. Models of the macro economy (of either type) consist of equations 
of two sorts: identities describing per-definition relations between variables and behavioural 
equations capturing researcher’s assumptions about decisions by economics agents on saving, 
investment, borrowing, lending, employment, and transactions. In equilibrium models, the action is 
in the behavioural assumptions, which drive model responses to shocks and determine performance 
forecasts. The typical behavioural assumption is individual optimization by economic agents of 
their objective function (consumption for households; profit for firms) to some equilibrium level. 
Unlike equilibrium models, the equations in accounting models represent a transactions 
(flow) matrix and a balance sheet (stock) matrix. Thus, the flow of funds is at the very heart of these 
models, unlike the mere unit-of-account function of money in equilibrium models. Explicit 
                                                 
7
 These issues are well within the purview of accounting research to critically analyze, but as Arnold (2009) notes, 
“we… failed to be … critical in the sense of recognizing the politically and socially contested nature of accounting 
practices… and to grasp developments within the world of accounting practice or describe the ways in which financial 
reporting standards, accounting firms, and accounting ideologies were implicated in the build up to the crisis.” 
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accounting models, such as those developed by Godley (1999), Graziani (2003), Keen (2006), 
Hudson (2006b) and Godley and Lavoie (2007) are grounded in the ‘endogenous money’ view of 
the economy, where banks’ credit creation is viewed as central and indispensible for transacting and 
thus for economic activity at large. Levels of wealth and debt are recognized to affect banks’, firms’ 
and the public’s balance sheets, and thus economic activity. The contrast is with neoclassical 
economics on which equilibrium models are based, where wealth plays no (or only a small) role and 
money is incidental to the economic process, which is seen as driven by real-sector fundamentals. 
This emphasis on financial balance sheets and the monetary nature of the economy is what 
distinguishes accounting models also from input-output models, which describe flows of goods and 
services perhaps denominated in money terms, but without finance and the flow of funds it 
generates playing a role in the model dynamics. For instance, “[f]lows of interest are not often 
discussed in the literature, although a model of the whole system cannot be solved unless they are 
explicitly included” (Godley 1999:397). 
As to behavioural equations, equating of marginal cost and revenue would be inconsistent 
with the radical uncertainty theorized by Keynes. This implies that firms are in a state of uncertainty 
over future sales and revenues and do not even know their precise objective function, let alone have 
the computing power to continually solve it, as in neoclassical theory. Hence firms cannot respond 
to future prices while planning future production. Rather, firms may be assumed to respond to sold 
quantities, via changes in their inventories. 
The introduction of uncertainty, and the absence of maximizing to a single optimum, 
likewise shapes the behavioural assumptions on households and the government. For instance, 
households are assumed to hold wealth in a number of assets, allocating over assets according to 
their expected returns. Consumption, in turn, depends on these wealth holding preferences as well 
as income. As expectations can be volatile, ‘when unexpected things happen, these assets move in 
correspondingly unexpected ways’ (Godley 1999: 397), and so does consumption, demand, and the 
wider economy. They depend, not on some equilibrium condition, but on how flows of funds and 
goods adjust to changes in stocks. Changes in this theoretical system therefore can be much more 
abrupt and economy-wide crisis resulting from perceptions and wealth changes is possible. 
As to underlying model philosophy, “a model, of necessity, is an abstraction from the full 
detail of the real world”, as Greenspan (2008) reminded his readers and himself after the crash. 
Accounting models differ from equilibrium models in what they abstract from. Equilibrium models 
abstract from the flow of funds and the stocks of credit and debt, and the systemic risks implied in 
them; they focus on the individual optimization problems facing individuals. It is assumes that any 
impact of the flow of funds and the stocks of credit and debt are fully reflected in returns and risks 
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at the individual level, so that this is what analysis needs to focus on. Accounting models abstract 
from optimization problems and focus on the flow of funds and the stocks of credit and debt. The 
assumption is  that individual decisions will always be reflected in the aggregate flow of funds and 
the stocks of credit and debt, and that this is where an economy’s rate of return and systemic risks 
are formed; and so that this is what a model needs to chart. 
When Greenspan (2008) wrote that “we will never have a perfect model of risk”, he meant 
individual-level, not systemic risk. His (and the mainstream) view is that systemic analysis is not 
valid scientifically without an individual-level underpinning (“micro fundamentals”), and is 
redundant with it. ”He espoused the idea that mathematical econometric models of individual 
behaviour are the only tools we will ever have” (Shiller 2008:42). This contrasts to the analyses 
discussed in section 3 which are all on the level of the economic system, not the individual. 
Relatedly, an important difference between accounting and equilibrium models is that the 
identity equations in an accounting model aim to reflect the flow of funds in the economy in a 
complete (though obviously stylised) manner. It is specified where each flow of funds comes from 
and where it goes. Each transaction is by some sector with some other sector (both well specified) 
and leads to two equal changes in balance sheets. In contrast, equilibrium models do not aim at such 
completeness. For instance, an increase in the money supply in an accounting model is reflected in 
changes in the accounts of banks and lenders, whereas an increase in the money supply in the 
typical macrocoenomic model (see Figure 4, top left) simply is an increase in the value of the 
money stock (M2 or M3) ex nihilo; the actual money creation process, and the accompanying flow 
of funds (principal and interest payments) is not specified. 
Accordingly, in equilibrium models, solving the optimization problems is what determines 
the model outcome. In accounting models, its completeness drives the outcome, as the ‘watertight 
accounting of the model implies that there will always be one equation which is logically implied 
by the others’ (Godley 1999:395) – with important practical implications. For instance, in 
accounting models including a private sector (firms and households), a government sector and a 
foreign sector, sectoral balances must sum to zero. This identity allowed Godley and Wray (2000) 
to conclude that ‘Goldilocks was doomed’: with a government surplus and current account deficit, 
economic growth had to be predicated on private debt growth – an inference impossible to make 
from an equilibrium model. Accounting models can identify a growth path as unsustainable given 
the existing bedrock accounting relations in our economic system, leading to a sure prediction of its 
reversal (even though the triggering event, and its timing, will be less clear). No such certainty is 
built into equilibrium models. 
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7. Accountants and Economists: Theoretical Pedigree of Macroeconomic Models 
 
In the last three sections, accounting (or flow-of-funds) and equilibrium models were identified and 
discussed with regard to their structure, institutionalization and underlying assumptions. Finally, it 
is illuminating to reflect on an important difference also in theoretical pedigree – a difference which 
goes back to the very beginnings of modern economics. Macro-economic equilibrium models are 
ultimately grounded in the model of a national economy pioneered by the French 18th century 
economist Francois Quesnay, who drew up the Tableau Economique, and whose followers were the 
first to be called ‘economists’. The Tableau described the circular flow of goods (but not of funds) 
through the various sectors of the economy. Accounting models, on the other hand, are circular-
flow models like Quesnay’s Tableau, but the emphasis on the importance of the circulation of funds 
(not only goods) distinguishes it from Quesnay and from modern equilibrium theory. This view of 
the economic system is summarized in ‘Say’s Law’ that ‘production creates its own demand’, 
named after the French 18th century thinker Jean Baptiste Say. 
The principal difference between the two views is that Quesnay and the économistes 
neglected the positive roles of trade, entrepreneurship, capital ownership, and money, and attributed 
all productive value ultimately to agriculture (which gave the school its name of Physiocrats). Say, 
in contrast, recognised what would now be called the demand side of the economy: the importance 
of the purchasing power embodied in money to keep the circular flow moving, and of the 
intermediaries of traders and bankers to make this happen. Demand must balance supply, and assets 
liabilities. The circulation of goods in the real economy is mirrored by the origination and 
movement of debt claims in the financial system, and the development of the complete economic 
system can only be understood taking both circuits into account. In contrast, money and other 
financial flows were absent from Quesnay’s Tableau. While it is true that “[b]oth Say’s Law and 
the theory of equilibrium income – its intellectual complement and historical rival – can be traced 
back to a common origin in the Physiocrats”, as Sowell (1972:219) wrote, this does little to help 
understand the important differences between the two approaches. Indeed, Say has often been 
misconstrued (Baumol, 1977). 
If the Physiocrats were économistes, then Say’s was an accountant’s approach to the 
national economy. The point he made in the Law that bears his name (‘production creates its own 
demand’) was not about a tendency to equilibrium. Say’s Law was not that in a free market, 
demand and supply will automatically equilibriate though the price mechanism leading to full 
employment – an interpretation of it that Keynes attacked during the Great Depression. Say’s Law 
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is an accountant’s logical equality: all sold output will be bought. "Inherent in supply is the 
wherewithal for its own consumption", is the literal translation from the French8. The purchasing 
power embodied in the funds acquired by producers to produce goods, passes via wages and profit 
to become the funds that embody the demand for those goods. Though this is an axiom, it is not 
therefore a tautology without analytical use. As demonstrated above, it is the very logical 
completeness of accounting models that allows for their distinctive forecasting ability, e.g. on how 
sustainable debt-driven growth is. For instance, it implies that if the funds acquired by producers to 
produce goods are drained to the FIRE sector in debt servicing, this will interrupt the productive 
flow of fund and so disrupt economic growth9. 
Say’s ‘accountant’s view’ of the economic system was the main cause of his dispute with 
the Physiocrats. Tellingly, the arch father of the Physiocrats, Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours, 
wrote to Say begging him to ‘leave the counting house’ and not to ‘imprison himself in the ideas 
and language of the British, a sordid people who value a man only by the money he spends…” 
(Whatmore 2001: 38). Discounting the Gallic chauvinism, Dupont had still keenly perceived the 
essence of Say’s view on the importance of purchasing power to set in motion the ‘wheel of 
commerce’, in the words of Adam Smith (whom Say venerated). It was this reality of the monetary 
side of the circular flow that is the economy, which Say attempted to capture – a dimension 
conveniently abstracted from in the Physiocrats’ system, which represented only the real economy, 
with money as a mere unit of account and a means of aggregation. 
Conversely, Say’s principal grudge against the Physiocrats (whom he ridiculed with zest) 
was their penchant for such abstraction. In his Treatise on Political Economy he wrote that 
“[i]nstead of first observing the nature of things, or the manner in which they take place, of 
classifying these observations, and deducing from them general propositions, they commenced by 
laying down certain abstract general propositions, which they styled axioms, from supposing them 
to contain inherent evidence of their own truth. They then endeavoured to accommodate the 
particular facts to them, and to infer from them their laws; thus involving themselves in the defence 
of maxims evidently at variance with common sense and universal experience…” (Treatise on 
Political Economy, Book I, paragraph 47). In terms of scientific method, there was a clash between 
the Physiocrats’ deductivism and Say’s inductivism. This is mirrored today in the deductivist 
methodology of neoclassical economics (which starts with ’abstract general propositions’) which 
differs from those heterodox approaches which aim to inductively ‘first observe the nature of 
                                                 
8
 As Sowell (1972) notes, Say’s Law in turn goes back on yet earlier observations, perhaps as early as Ecclesiastes 5:11 
(3rd century BC): "As goods increase, so do those who consume them”. 
9
 I thanks Gunnar Tomasson for drawing my attention to the original interpretation of Say’s Law. 
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things’ before moving to ‘general propositions’. Accounting models include the flow of funds in the 
‘nature of things’ to be reflected in its general proposition (or models); equilibrium models abstract 
from the flow of funds and from accounting relations from the very first of its axioms. So although 
“[b]oth Say’s law and the theory of equilibrium income – its intellectual complement and historical 
rival – can be traced back to a common origin in the Physiocrats…“ (Sowell 1973:219), their 
analytical view differed widely already at the beginning. 
The intellectual duel between Say and the Physiocrats gave rise to two distinct schools. In 
the development of economics as a discipline, it is fair to say that the Physiocrat approach won this 
duel hands down. Say’s approach survived via the works of, among others, Mill (1848), Keynes 
(1930) and Schumpeter (1954) into current theorizing by the ‘Post-Keynesian’ and ‘circuitist’ 
schools of economics (e.g. Rochon 1999; Fontana 2000; Graziani 2003). This emphasizes the 
circular flow of funds, accounting relations in the economy, and the monetary context of production 
and consumption. Academically, this approach is marginalized. It is not taught in academic 
(under)graduate courses on money and banking or on monetary policy, nor publicised in even the 
top 100 of economics journals (ranked, for instance, by impact rating). 
In contrast, the neglect of credit and debt remained central as 18th and 19th century political 
economy developed into the 20th century academic discipline of economics. It was incorporated in 
(and greatly facilitated) the ‘Marginal Revolution’ in the late 19th century, which installed 
individual optimization firmly as the central organizing principle in economic models. Its core 
model of the economy became Leon Walras’ construction of a set of interconnected commodity 
markets which simultaneously clear through the interaction of commodity price signals. This laid 
the foundation for general equilibrium theory, with no role for money (let alone credit and debt). 
The Tableau Economique also underpinned the later invention of input-output models pioneered by 
Wasily Leontief, and operationalised into national accounting models from the 1930s to 1950s by 
Richard Stone in the UK, Ragnar Frisch in Norway, Jan Tinbergen in the Netherlands and Robert 
Solow in the US. In the construction of the national statistics, the Tableau culminated in the System 
of National Accounts, the authorative prescription for GDP calculations published jointly by the 
United Nations, the Commission of the European Communities, the International Monetary Fund, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Bank. In academic 
analysis, the Physiocrat spirit culminated in money-less Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
models widely used today in policy analyses as diverse as fiscal reform, development planning, 
international trade and environmental regulation (Wing 2004:2). 
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8. Summary, Reflections and Conclusions 
 
This paper made the fundamental point that recognizing the accounting forms in which economic 
relations of necessity exist, is indispensible for understanding the economic and financial system’s 
sustainability. Those forms are perhaps best analyzed in flow-of-fund or ‘accounting’ models of the 
macro economy. This argument was developed with reference to the discrepancy between 
professional assessment and reality before and during the 2007-8 credit crisis and ensuing recession. 
It documented the sense of surprise at the credit crisis among academics and policymakers, giving 
rise to the view that ‘no one saw this coming’. Contradicting this common opinion, it carefully 
documented the analyses by those professional and academic analysts who did ‘see it coming’, and 
who issued public predictions of financial instability induced by falling real estate prices and 
leading to recession. The common elements in their analyses were identified, implying an 
‘accounting’ view of the economy. The structure of accounting (or flow-of-funds) models 
underlying these predictions was explored, as were the structure and crisis prediction performance 
of ‘equilibrium’ models used to form official forecasts in central banks, by governments and by 
international bodies. The key differences between the two types of models were brought out in a 
systematic comparison of their underlying assumptions and their theoretical pedigrees. It was also 
suggested that the institutionalization of official models, and their reflection of mainstream 
economic theories, may so far have precluded the adoption of accounting models. In conclusion of 
this paper, two reflections seem apt. 
 In introducing accounting concepts into conventional models (as the OECD is doing), the 
challenge may well be to explore how far model synergies and incompatibilities reach, and what 
type of model is best fit for which purpose. In the context of break points in economic development 
such as the credit crisis, it is “better to be roughly right than precisely wrong’, as Keynes famously 
wrote. In situations where the FIRE sector plays a crucial role, equilibrium models provide detailed 
forecasts on e.g. labour force participation, unit costs, hourly compensation and civilian 
employment, but fail to anticipate momentous change due to debt growth. Conversely, the 
accounting models reviewed here include far less detail on the real sector but are better at 
identifying finance-driven turning points. 
Such exploration of the synergies and proper domains of accounting and equilibrium models, 
however, would require an open-minded consideration of the merits of accounting models of the 
economy. This still appears to sit uneasily with the continued dominance in policy making and 
academia (including the field of accounting) of neoclassical economics. Hopwood (2009) views 
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economics as “a subject … appearing as one that invest quite heavily in the policing of its 
intellectual boundaries” and where “much of the diversity [of debates] has been banished”. Arnold 
(2009) likewise self-criticizes the accounting field by asserting that “our dominant theories provided 
an insufficient bases for understanding the transformations that were occurring in the international 
political economy over the past quarter century or for analyzing the relationship between macro 
level changes, such as the rise to power of the financial sector, and the micro level field of financial 
accounting practice.” In parallel to the promotion by some of an ‘economics of accounting’ to 
improve analysis in the field of management accounting (Christensen and Feltham 2007; Jordan 
1989), there appears to be scope for an ‘accounting of economics’ in the field of macroeconomic 
and macrofinancial stability assessment and forecasting. 
This research programme would have as its central tenet that we need to understand how 
dynamics in accounting relations underpin and shape our economies. The underlying reason is that 
economic relations and transactions in modern economies are embedded in the double-entry 
accounting framework. All transacting is predicated on economic agents extending credit to each 
other, and credit (whether trade credit or bank credit) is fungible with money. Money is not just a 
unit of account; it is the reflection of relations of debit and credit, and thus money itself is an 
accounting concept (Wray 1998, 2004). Having a monetary economic system predicated on 
accounting relations and the regulations that shape them, implies that an accounting lens is 
indispensable in the analysis of financial stability. This is the accounting dimension of the 
‘significance of the monetary context of economic behavior’ also researched in heterodox 
economics (Fontana and Gerard 2002). More specifically, the balance sheets of firms, households 
and governments, and the regulations in the economic system on what sorts of balance sheets are 
being allowed, co-determine what forms new credit flows can take, how much there can be of it to 
different sectors (e.g. to the FIRE sector versus the real economy), and consequently how the 
economy will evolve. These will not be the only factors shaping the economy, but neither can they 
be fully abstracted from, as is current practice in much of economic research. In sum, there seem to 
be important contributions that accounting researchers can make to economics - rather than just the 
other way round, as is sometimes suggested. 
Indeed, Arnold (2009) urges that accounting researchers need to be asking questions such as 
“why did standard setters adopt fair value accounting for financial instruments without regard for 
the macroeconomic consequences of sanctioning the proliferation of complex, unregulated and 
systematically dangerous financial products?”. Accounting researchers should be bolder in pointing 
out and analyzing the implications of specific accounting rules and practices for macroeconomic 
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development, and probing the political economy reasons for their introduction. This study has 
sought to provide a context for such research to be undertaken. 
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Appendix: They Saw It Coming 
 
 
In collecting the data presented in this Appendix in an extensive search of the relevant literature, 
four selection criteria were applied. Only analysts were included who provide some account on how 
they arrived at heir conclusions. Another criterion was that analysts went beyond predicting a real 
estate crisis, also making the link to real-sector recessionary implications, including an analytical 
account of those links10. Third, the actual prediction must be made by the analyst and available in 
the public domain, rather than being asserted by others. Finally, the prediction had to have some 
timing attached to it11.  
The twelve analysts described here – the number is entirely an outcome of the selection 
criteria – commented on the US, UK, Australian and Danish situations. All are (or were) analysts or 
commentators of global fame. They are presented in alphabetical order. 
 
Dean Baker is co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington12. Baker 
discussed the consequences of the bubble in the US housing market in 2002, when he wrote that 
“[w]hile the short-term effects of a housing bubble appear very beneficial—just as was the case 
with the stock bubble and the dollar bubble—the long-term effects from its eventual deflation can 
be extremely harmful, both to the economy as a whole, and to tens of millions of families that will 
see much of their equity disappear unexpectedly. The economy will lose an important source of 
demand as housing construction plummets and the wealth effect goes into reverse. This will slow an 
economy already reeling from the effects of the collapse of the stock bubble [of 1999, 
DJB]…Unfortunately, most of the nation’s political and economic leadership remained oblivious to 
the dangers of the stock market and dollar bubbles until they began to deflate. This failure created 
the basis for the economic uncertainty the country currently faces … [which] will be aggravated 
further by the deflation of the housing bubble. This process will prove even more painful if the 
housing bubble is allowed to expand still further before collapsing” (Baker 2002). Further expand it 
                                                 
10
 This criterion excludes, for instance, John Talbott, a former investment banker for Goldman Sachs and a visiting 
scholar at UCLA’s management school. He wrote The Coming Crash of the Housing Market” and Sell Now! The End of 
the Housing Bubble (January 2006), both of which accurately described overlending practices and the housing bubble. 
Talbott hints at the wider implications but does not analyse them. 
11
 This last criterion excludes economist Raghuram Rajan of the University of Chicago who in a 2005 paper discussed 
how perverse incentives in deregulated financial markets posed a risk to the economy, but without any indication of 
when  trouble might break. The paper was presented at a Kansas City Federal Reserve Symposium under the theme of  
“The Greenspan era: Lessons for the Future”. It also excludes Claudio Borio, an economist with the Bank for 
International Settlements, who in a 2004 paper titled “ Market Distress And Vanishing Liquidity: Anatomy And Policy 
Options” wrote that “contrary to conventional wisdom, the growth of markets for tradable instruments, and hence the 
greater scope to sell assets and raise cash, need not actually reduce the likelihood of traditional funding liquidity crises. 
Conceivably, in fact, it could even raise that likelihood,…” 
12
 Not to be confused with the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research, which never predicted a crisis. 
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did, and in early 2004 Baker sponsored a $1,000 essay contest to solicit the most-convincing 
argument that the housing market was not in a bubble13 (Lewis, 2004). In May 2004, Baker sold his 
apartment in the Washington Adams Morgan. He was quoted as saying “I felt like a fool holding 
onto it I’m pretty sure that prices around here will plummet”14. 
In 2005 Baker predicted in a scholarly paper that asset prices in the US were bound to fall in 
the medium term (Baker et al 2005). In November 2006, he published the more urgent Recession 
Looms for the U.S. Economy in 2007 in which he forecasts that weakness in the housing market was 
likely to push the economy into a recession in 2007, predicting -0.7 % GDP growth over 2007. 
Baker wrote that “[t]he wealth effect created by the housing bubble fuelled an extraordinary surge 
in consumption over the last five years, as savings actually turned negative. …This home equity-
fuelled consumption will be sharply curtailed in the near future…. The result will be a downturn in 
consumption spending, which together with plunging housing investment, will likely push the 
economy into recession….Over the course of the year, the economy will shed 1.2 million jobs.” 
Baker’s prediction was only slightly premature as official US GDP growth remained a positive 2 % 
in 2007 on average, though falling towards the end of the year. The US recession officially started 
in December 2007, costing 1.6 jobs till December 2008 (BEA figures).  
 
Wynne Godley is a Distinguished Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New 
York and a Visiting Research Associate with the Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance 
(2002-2005). From 2000 he has consistently argued that a US housing market slowdown was 
unavoidable in the medium term, and that its implication would be recession in the US. Godley 
warned that ‘Goldilocks is doomed’, as he put it in a 2000 article with Wray. ‘Goldilocks’ was the 
simile after the children’s tale, employed in the years after the dotcom crash for the US economy, 
which was said to be neither too ‘cold’ (low unemployment) nor too ‘hot’ (low inflation). Godley 
and Wray (2000) argued that this stability was unsustainable, as it was driven by households’ debt 
growth, in turn fuelled by capital gains in the real estate sector. Based on an accounting framework 
of the US economy developed by Godley (on which more below), they predicted that that as soon as 
debt growth slowed down – as it inevitably would within years -, growth would falter. When house 
prices had started to fall, Godley and Zezza (2006) published Debt and Lending: A Cri de Coeur. 
They demonstrated again the US economy’s dependence on debt growth and argued that only the 
small slowdown in the rate at which US household debt levels were rising, resulting form the house 
                                                 
13
 The winning essayist, Hilary Croke, was a researcher for the Federal Reserve. 
14
 The average price of Adams Morgan neighbourhood started dropping from their November 2005 peak of US$ 
551,000 to a low of US$ 480,000 in January 2007. It was at the same level in February 2009 (data from zillow.com). 
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price decline, would immediately lead to a “sustained growth recession … somewhere before 2010” 
(Godley and Zezza, 2006:3). In January 2007, the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
produced its annual report, which, as Godley and others noted in an April 2007 analysis, had 
predictions on GDP and inflation “indicating a Goldilocks world in the medium term” which they 
deemed ”wildly implausible” (p.1) as it required continued growth in household indebtedness while 
real estate collateral values were I na steep and continued fall. In contrast to CBO projections of 
GDP growth averaging 2.85 percent between 2007 and 2010, Godley in April 2007 predicted output 
growth “slowing down almost to zero sometime between now and 2008 and then recovering toward 
3 percent or thereabouts in 2009–10”; but warned that “unemployment [will] start to rise 
significantly and does not come down again.” (Godley et al 2007: 3). Again, in November 2007 
Godley and others forecast “a significant drop in borrowing and private expenditure in the coming 
quarters, with severe consequences for growth and unemployment”. These forecasts describe the 
actual developments from spring 2007 until the time of this writing in spring 2009. If anything, they 
were sanguine: US growth not only ‘slowed to zero’ but actually turned negative in 2008, and the 
recovery ‘toward 3 percent or thereabouts in 2009–10’ is now widely forecast, but yet to start. 
 
The British Fred Harrison in his first book, “The Power in the Land” (1983), forecast the recessions 
in the leading industrial economies in 1992. In 2005 he published Boom Bust, warning that the 
property market is subject to a sharp downturn at the end of a regular 18-year cycle, based on 
Harrison’s study of UK property markets over the last 200 years. At a time when the consensus 
among forecasters was that the boom in house prices would cool to an annual 2 or 3% rise over the 
following years, Harrison analysed that a ‘winner’s curse’ phase of the cycle would see UK home 
prices rise by more than 10% per annum – which they did over 2006 and 2007. An updated second 
edition of Boom Bust predicted that the next property market tipping point was due at end of 2007 
or early 2008. The reason for the instability, Harrison explained, is not the housing market itself but 
the land market. Economic expansion encourages speculation, with banks lending more against 
escalating asset values and reinforcing the upward spiral. The only way land prices can be brought 
back to affordable levels is a slump or recession, undermining the banking system and causing 
widespread unemployment and repossessions. The UK housing market started collapsing in 
November 2007, followed by the recession Harrison had forecast. 
 
Michael Hudson is a Distinguished Research Professor of Economics at the University of Missouri 
(Kansas City), president of the Institute for the Study of Long-term Economic Trends and a Wall 
Street financial analyst. Hudson has criticized economic growth based on asset price inflation as 
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unsustainable and polarizing. Based on his monitoring of the US National Product and Income 
Accounts, he wrote Saving, Asset-Price Inflation, and Debt-Induced Deflation, a paper presented at 
a 2004 academic conference and subsequently published as Hudson (2006a). In it, he noted the 
‘large debt overhead – and the savings that form the balance-sheet counterpart to it’ as the ‘anomaly 
of today’s [US] economy’. He warned against the ‘self expanding growth of savings’ and the 
unsustainable ‘growth of net worth through capital gains’, fuelled by US monetary policies (of 
generous credit flows and decreasing interest rates) and tax policies (of un-taxing real estate gains 
in their treatment of  depreciation and interest payments). In his analysis, the “natural limit to the 
process was reached in 2004 when the Federal Reserve reduced its discount rate to 1 percent. Once 
rates hit this nadir, further growth in debt threatens to be reflected in draining and amortization 
payments away from spending on goods and services, slowing the economy accordingly.” 
In 2005 Hudson wrote ‘The Road to Serfdom: An Illustrated Guide to the Coming Real 
Estate Collapse’, which was published in April 2006 in Harper’s Magazine. In it he wrote 
that ”almost everyone involved in the real estate bubble thus far has made at least a few dollars. But 
that is about to change. The bubble will burst… America holds record mortgage debt in a declining 
housing market… For those who bought at the top and who now face decades of payments on 
houses that soon will be worth less than they paid for them, serious trouble is brewing. …. Rising 
debt-service payments will further divert income from new consumer spending. Taken together, 
these factors will further shrink the “real” economy, drive down those already declining real wages, 
and push our debt-ridden economy into Japan-style stagnation or worse.” (Hudson 2006b). That 
summer the housing market turned, leading to the credit crisis and recession a year later. 
 
Eric Janszen is an investor and commentator. He established the iTulip website in November 1998 
to parody the then rampant ‘Internet Bubble’ as a speculative mania. He called the top of the 
dotcom bubble in March 2000 and shut the site down after the dotcom crash of that year; but started 
it again as the housing market developed into what he believed to be a bubble. In August 2001 
Janszen (2001) “expected that after the technology bubble crash the Federal Reserve and 
government was certain via tax cuts, rate cuts, and stealth dollar devaluation to induce a reflation 
boom like the 1934 – 1937 reflation created after the 1929 stock market bubble bust. Like that 
reflation, the stock market after 2001 was unlikely to produce meaningful inflation-adjusted 
results.” 
In 2006 he wrote in America’s Bubble Economy: Profit When It Pops that the US would 
enter a recession within years. In December 2007 he warned subscribers to his investment advice 
that US stock markets were likely to begin in 2008 to experience a “Debt Deflation Bear Market” 
 39 
market that would more or less track the Nikkei during the first year of the Japanese debt deflation, 
when it lost 40 % from December 1989 to December 1990. The Dow Jones then declined from 
13,365 points in December 2007 to 7,880 points in December 2008, losing 42 % of its value. 
Janszen (2009) writes that “this forecast was uncomplicated if you understood the simple 
underlying dynamic: US households and businesses, and the government itself, had since 1980 built 
up too much debt. The rate of increase in debt was unsustainable… Huge imbalances in the US and 
global economy developed for over 30 years. Now they are rebalancing, as many non-mainstream 
economists have warned was certain to happen sooner or later, warnings which were argued as 
alarmist by mainstream economists. The global monetary system … started to come apart in 2007 
following the crash of the securitized debt market, that followed the collapse of the housing bubble. 
It had to come apart anyway; the securitized bond market happened to be the proximate cause.” 
 
Stephen Keen is Associate Professor of Economics & Finance at the University of Western Sydney 
and a fellow of the Centre for Policy Development. A specialist in financial instability, – he 
published an academic paper in 1995 titled Finance and Economic Breakdown – Keen (2008) wrote 
that “[i]n December 2005, almost two years before the crisis hit, I realized that a serious financial 
crisis was approaching. I was so worried about its probable severity–and the lack of awareness 
about it amongst policy makers–that I took the risk (for an academic) of going very public about my 
views. I began commenting on economic policy in the media, started the DebtWatch Report, 
registered a webpage with the apt name of www.debtdeflation.com, and established the blog Steve 
Keen’s Oz Debtwatch.” 
He first publicly predicted Australia’s financial troubles in December 2005 in an interview 
on Perth radio and ABC Radio. In December 2006, Keen (2006) wrote that the debt-to-GDP ratio in 
Australia (then 147 per cent) “will exceed 160 per cent of GDP by the end of 2007. We simply can’t 
keep borrowing at that rate. We have to not merely stop the rise in debt, but reverse it. 
Unfortunately, long before we manage to do so, the economy will be in a recession. The reasons are 
simple: paying down excessive debt causes borrowers to stop spending… So when will this 
recession begin? On current data, the domestic economy may already be in one – though the China 
boom has more than compensated for the domestic downturn. What can be done to avoid it? 
Unfortunately, almost nothing.” In September 2007 he published, with the Centre for Policy 
Development, the report “Deeper in Debt”, writing that “our current problems [will] lead, I expect, 
to severe economic dislocation” (Keen 2007: 45). In January 2009 the IMF revised its 1.8 % 
forecast for Australian GDP growth in 2009 down by an unprecedented 2 %, to  – 0.2 % 
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(Stutchbury 2009). The Reserve Bank of Australia in May 2009 revised its 2009 forecast from 0.5 
% to -1.0 % (Kwok 2009). 
 
Jakob Brøchner Madsen is a professor in economics at Monash University.  From 2003, while 
professor in economics at the University of Copenhagen, he has questioned the sustainability of 
Denmark’s growth. According to Madsen, Danes were living on borrowed time because of the 
mortgage debt which “had never been greater in our economic history”. The Danish business paper 
Børsen in its December 4, 2008 issue featured an overview of his forebodings (Agaard 2008). In 
2003 Madsen wrote “I am very pessimistic. We are heading into something in the world which is 
worse than what we experienced in 1982 [the last Danish recession, DJB]. It will be the worst 
recession since the Second World War”. In 2004: “There is something completely wrong. We are 
seeing large bubbles and if they bust, there is no backup. House prices and shares are completely 
out of proportion. And it will go wrong. … The outlook is very bad for families in Denmark.” In 
2005: “I feel lost. Money growth is increasing, oil and commodity prices have doubled in the last 10 
years. Therefore inflation and interest rates should increase, but nothing happens. All the models we 
use to predict inflation have broken down, it is chaos.” 
Under Madsen’s supervision, his student Jens Kjaer Sørensen wrote an MA thesis in 2005-
2006 on ’The Dynamics of House Prices – International Evidence’ going back to 1920s-1930s (to 
the 1840s for the Netherlands). In it, Sørensen demonstrated the existence of the first international 
synchronized housing boom in the UK, Norway, US and the Netherlands. He showed that credit 
growth due to liberalization was the prime cause, and that it was a bubble, i.e. prices would 
inevitably fall sharply to their long-run trends. The bursting of this bubble “will have a severe 
impact on the world economy and may even result in a recession” (Sørensen, 2006:97). 
Jacob Brøchner Madsen moved to Monash University in 2006. His farewell talk at the 
University of Copenhagen on July 1, 2006 was entitled “Anatomy of the Bubble-Bust Cycle in the 
Danish Housing Market” In 2007, Madsen observed that “houses are overvalued and it is only a 
matter of time before they will start falling”. He predicted a decrease by up to 40 %. According to 
StatBank Denmark data, the growth in family homes price in Denmark petered out in the third 
quarter of 2007, and prices declined from that peak by 12 % until the end of 2008, the latest 
observation the time of this writing. Economic growth halved from 3.3 % in 2006 to 1.6 % in 2007 
and the economy contracted by 1.1 % over 2008 (source: StatBank Denmark) 15.  
 
                                                 
15
 I thank Jens Sørensen for providing details and help in data collection in the Danish case study.  
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Kurt Richebächer (1918-2007) wrote one of the longest-standing investment newsletters, “The 
Richebächer Letter,” which at various times also circulated as “Currencies & Credit Markets.” 
Richebächer was chief economist for Dresdner Bank from 1964 and moved into private consultancy 
in 1977. He warned against the bubble in technology stocks in the late ’90s. After its collapse, he 
warned against the bubble in housing, writing in September 2001: “the new housing boom is 
another rapidly inflating asset bubble financed by the same loose money practices that fuelled the 
stock market bubble.” He went on to predict “that the housing bubble – together with the bond and 
stock bubbles – will invariably implode in the foreseeable future, plunging the U.S. economy into a 
protracted, deep recession.” (Bonner 2007). 
Writing in 2006, Richebächer held that “the recovery of the U.S. economy since November 
2001 has been dominated by an unprecedented consumer borrowing-and-spending–
binge. …”wealth creation” though soaring asset prices has been driven by ultra-cheap and loose 
money and credit, and not by saving and investment…” Richebächer (2006a:4). Just before the 
turning of the US housing market in summer 2006, Richebächer (2006a:4) in July 2006 commented 
that “[t]he one thing that still separates the U.S. economy from economic and financial disaster is 
rising house prices that apparently justify ever more credit and debt”… “Given this precarious 
income situation on the one hand and the debt explosion on the other, it will be clear that in the 
foreseeable future there will be heavy selling of houses, with prices crashing for lack of buyers” 
(Richebächer, 2006a:11). As this prospect began to materialize in the next month, Richebächer 
wrote in his August 2006 newsletter that “a recession and bear market in asset prices are inevitable 
for the U.S. economy. … This will not be a garden-variety recession, in which monetary easing 
unleashes pent-up demand, as it used to do in past business cycles”. He again emphasized its cause: 
“the great trouble for the future is that the credit bubble has its other side in exponential debt 
growth” … “The U.S. liquidity deluge of the last few years has had one single source: borrowing 
against rising assets backed by the Fed’s monetary looseness… all hinging on further rises in asset 
prices. But they are going to plunge” (Richebächer, 2006b:1,5,9,11-12). And in September 2006 he 
wrote hat “housing bubbles, when bursting, generally do considerable damage to the economy. 
Today, they are bound to do far more damage….” (Richebächer, 2006c:4). The question was not if, 
but “how fast the U.S. economy and its asset markets will turn down. … “There is no question that 
the U.S. housing bubble is finished. All remaining questions pertain solely to speed, depth and 
duration of the economy’s downturn” (Richebächer, 2006c:9). 
Paul Volker, former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve and a long-time friend of 
Richebächer, once remarked that the challenge for modern central bankers “is to prove Kurt 
Richebächer wrong.” Richebächer regarded the expansion of credit under Greenspan as laying the 
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foundation of the worst post-World War II economic contraction. He died on August 24, 2007, two 
weeks after the events leading up to that contraction began (Bonner, 2007). 
 
Nouriel Roubini is Professor of Economics and International Business at the Stern School of 
Business, New York University, Research Associate at the NBER and Research Fellow with the 
CEPR. He is a former advisor to the U.S. Treasury Department and former member White House 
Council of Economic Advisers. He runs the Roubini Global Economics Monitor and a Global 
Economics Blog (http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini, from which all quotes below are taken). 
He predicted in summer 2005 that real home prices were likely to fall at least 30% over the next 3 
years, and published warnings about the recessionary implications from the very beginning of the 
house price decline. On August 23, 2006, he wrote that “[b]y itself this [house price] slump is 
enough to trigger a US recession”. On August 30, he wrote that “[t]he recent increased financial 
problems of … sub-prime lending institutions may thus be the proverbial canary in the mine – or tip 
of the iceberg – and signal the more severe financial distress that many housing lenders will face 
when the current housing slump turns into a broader and uglier housing bust that will be associated 
with a broader economic recession. You can then have millions of households with falling wealth, 
reduced real incomes and lost jobs…” In a Nov 17, 2006 blog he analysed that “the housing 
recession is now becoming a construction recession; and the construction recession is now turning 
into a clear auto and manufacturing recession; and the manufacturing recession will soon turn into a 
retail recession as squeezed households – facing falling home prices and rising mortgage servicing 
costs – sharply contract their rate of consumption.”  He correctly predicted that quantitative easing 
by the Federal Reserve would lead to a short lived stock rally at the end of 2006, turning into a 
share price plunge once a coming recession was obvious towards mid 2007. Through 2006 and 
2007, Roubini continued warning of further house price falls (where others saw it bottoming out), 
and of its systemic implications leading to recession in 2007.  
 
Peter Schiff is a stock broker, investment adviser and commentator. He was an economic adviser for 
Ron Paul’s campaign in the 2008 Republican Party primaries.  On May 16, 2006 in debate on the 
television channel Fox News, Schiff forecast that the U.S. housing market was a bubble that would 
soon burst. In an August 2006 CBNC interview, Peter Schiff asserted that : “[t]he United States 
economy is like the Titanic ...I see a real financial crisis coming for the United States.” He rose to 
media prominence following the publication of his book early 2007 book Crash Proof: How to 
Profit From the Coming Economic Collapse. Written over the previous two years, Crash Proof 
 43 
predicted the popping of the US housing bubble and the consequent financial crisis, including the 
failure of mortgage banks Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the collapse of the US financial sector.  
 
Robert Shiller is a Yale economics professor who predicted both the dotcom and housing bubbles. 
Shiller has noted that too much potential wealth is still locked up in land and real estate. In order to 
trace that wealth he created, with Karl Case, the authorative Case-Shiller Index of US home-prices. 
In The New Financial Order (2003) Shiller warned that infatuation with the stock market was 
fuelling volatility and distracting us from more durable economic prospects of building up real 
assets (as opposed to financial assets), ‘’fundamental to our well-being but increasingly exposed to 
pervasive risks” (Karabell, 2009). 
He published a book, Irrational Exuberance, on a bursting stock-market bubble just as the 
burst arrived in March 2000, and another, The Subprime Solution on the subprime meltdown just as 
the meltdown went global in summer 2008. He warned that home prices were looking “very 
anomalous” in the 2nd edition of Irrational Exuberance in 2005, published one year before the 
market turned. In the preface to that edition he wrote that “ further rises in the [stock and housing] 
markets could lead, eventually, to even more significant declines… A long-run consequence could 
be a decline in consumer and business confidence, and another, possibly worldwide, recession. This 
extreme outcome … is not inevitable, but it is a much more serious risk than is widely 
acknowledged.” Again, in August 2006 he wrote that “there is significant risk of a very bad period, 
with slow sales, slim commissions, falling prices, rising default and foreclosures, serious trouble in 
financial markets, and a possible recession sooner than most of us expected” (Case and Shiller, 
2006). 
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